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Title: At the limits of Cultural Heritage Rights? The Glasgow Bajuni Campaign and the UK 
Immigration System: A Case Study. 
Abstract: In 2003, the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage 
formalised provision for forms of heritage not solely rooted in the material world.  This 
expanded the scope and accessibility of cultural heritage rights for communities and groups. 
To much commentary and critique, the UK has infamously not ratified the 2003 ICH 
Convention.  This paper examines the implications of the UK’s decision not to ratify the 
Convention for the cultural heritage and human rights of a minority, asylum-seeking group 
in Glasgow, Scotland.  Based on participatory ethnographic fieldwork with the group and 
analysis of their asylum cases, it makes two observations: first, that the UK’s absence from 
the Convention establishes a precedent in which other state actors (i.e. immigration 
authorities) are emboldened to advance scepticism over matters involving Intangible 
Cultural Heritage; second, that despite this, limitations in current provisions in the 2003 ICH 
Convention would provide the group with little additional protection than they currently 
have.  Developing these observations, we critique current UK approaches to ICH as 
complicit in the maintenance of hierarchies and the border.  Finally, we consider the extent 
to which the current provisions of the 2003 ICH Convention might be improved to include 
migrant and asylum-seeking groups.   
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At the limits of Cultural Heritage Rights? The Glasgow Bajuni Campaign and the UK 
Immigration System: A Case Study 
 
In recent decades, the relationship between cultural heritage and human rights has become a 
focus of discussion.  Scholars have increasingly recognised a person's access to cultural 
heritage as a fundamental right1, and noted that cultural heritage is often connected to a person's 
right to broader social expression, and other human rights.2  This growing recognition of the 
links between cultural heritage rights and human rights has contributed to and extended into 
discussions about the status of intangible cultural heritage (ICH).  Intangible cultural heritage 
was formally recognised in the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible 
Cultural Heritage.3  Though the Convention is not without problems, it provided the first 
instance of formal recognition to forms of heritage that were not solely rooted in the material 
world (the built environment, material artefacts and so on).  By expanding the scope of heritage 
to include intangible forms of cultural expression, the 2003 Convention redefined heritage as 
something that was living, practiced and elastic.4  For the first time, communities whose 
heritage largely manifested in intangible rather than tangible forms of expression had specific 
and formalised access to UNESCO’s protections.  Though the state nonetheless remained 
involved in nominating a community’s ICH for protection, this nonetheless meant that 
UNESCO provisions were a little more accessible for minority communities and groups.5 
The UK has rather infamously not ratified the 2003 ICH Convention.  The UK 
Government have sought to justify this decision on the basis that ICH is given provision in 
                                                     
1 Logan, Langfield and Nic Craith 2010, Shaheed 2011, Silverman and Ruggles 2007. 
2 UNESCO 2005 
3 UNESCO 2003a 
4 CESCR 2009, Art. 11 
5 Albeit with some limitations – see Logan, below 
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other instruments to which it is a signatory.6  However, Smith et al. have suggested the UK’s 
reluctance to ratify the Convention instead must be understood in the context of the UK’s 
dominant heritage discourse, which continues to emphasise heritage in tangible, fixed terms.7 
The lack of a UK signature to the Convention has prompted concern amongst community 
groups and advocates, who fear that their particular expressions of ICH will suffer from a lack 
of specialised protection.8  However, others have suggested that minority and vulnerable 
populations might in fact encounter some benefits of remaining outside the Convention.  For 
instance, Logan suggests that ratification of the Convention by the state has the potential to 
place minority groups in vulnerable positions, especially in cases where communities are not 
really involved in the prior process of assessment, or in cases where ‘authorised discourses’9 
occlude the approaches to minority groups to ICH.  These cases, Hall notes, ‘are always 
inflected by the power and authority of those who have colonised the past, whose versions of 
history matter’.10  In instruments such as the 2003 Convention, in which the state has final 
responsibility for submitting nomination dossiers,11 there is therefore potential for the cultural 
heritage and human rights of minority groups to be subordinated to the priorities of the state. 
12  
Since the UK has continued to decline to sign the 2003 Convention, in the main, 
discussions about the potentials and pitfalls of the UK’s (non)ratification of the Convention 
have remained literally and figuratively academic.  Interactions between cultural heritage rights 
and human rights and between rights to ICH and the 2003 ICH Convention are complex, messy 
and have multiple possible outcomes for future ICH provisions, for the state and for the 
                                                     
6 Smith et al 2008, see also Hassard 2009 
7 Smith and Waterton 2009, page 297 
8 Howell 2008 
9 Smith 2006 
10 Hall 2005, 6 
11 Kuutma 2013 
12 Harrison 2013, 136 
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communities within it. A better understanding of the full implications – and multiple possible 
outcomes – of the UK’s stance both on the 2003 Convention and on its relationship to human 
rights is therefore overdue.  Moreover, we would suggest, analysis of this relationship must be 
grounded in the empirical experiences of groups and communities living with the outcomes of 
the current situation in the UK.  
We do this in the context of the experiences of the Glasgow Bajuni Campaign.  The 
experiences of the campaigners have been gathered over two years of ethnographic 
participatory research13 in Glasgow   Based in Glasgow, Scotland (UK), the Glasgow Bajuni 
Campaign ran between 2013 and 2015, and was a grassroots campaign that protested the 
experiences of a small group of Somali Bajuni people seeking asylum in the UK.  The asylum 
applications of all the seven members of the campaign group had all been repeatedly refused 
by UK immigration authorities.  The campaigners’14 cases had been built – and rejected – on 
iterations of their intangible cultural heritage, including their knowledge of Bajuni cultural 
practices, and their abilities in Bajuni languages.  Following the refusal of their asylum 
applications, the campaigners have faced prolonged destitution, and possible detention and 
deportation.  Considered in terms of cultural and human rights, the Glasgow Bajuni 
campaigners’ cases raises a number of complexities.  First, the centrality of language to the 
Bajuni campaigners’ cases is an issue of some controversy, not only within the context of their 
                                                     
13 Fieldwork was conducted in Glasgow between January 2014 and December 2015.  It 
combined ethnographic ontologies with participatory research methods (Phipps 2013).  E. Hill 
assisted the group with their campaigning work and provided administrative, research and 
social support to campaign members.  Due to the sensitivity of the campaigners’ cases, no 
formal interviews were recorded, but their comments and perspectives were noted as part of 
the long-term participant observation that accompanied the participatory research. 
14 All names included in this paper were changed to protect the identity of informants. 
   
 
 5  
 
asylum applications,15 but also for its status as an instance of intangible cultural heritage.16 
Secondly, the location of the campaigners’ cases within UK asylum infrastructure places 
questions about cultural heritage rights with fundamental human rights.  Under the 1948 
Declaration of Human Rights, the act of seeking asylum is identified as a fundamental human 
right.17  This right is further enshrined by the 1951 UN Convention for Refugees.18  In these 
circumstances, there is an argument to be made that by dismissing the intangible cultural 
heritages (their linguistic and cultural practices) upon which the Bajuni campaigners’ cases are 
built, UK Immigration authorities are placing their fundamental human right to seek asylum 
and freedom from persecution at risk.  Furthermore, one might argue, if this human right is 
placed at risk, so too are the campaigners’ cultural heritage rights.19  One might also ask 
whether the Immigration authorities’ dismissal of the campaigners’ intangible cultural 
heritages is informed by a scepticism towards ICH and cultural heritage rights. 
 A key question here is therefore: to what extent does the UK Government’s refusal to 
ratify the 2003 ICH Convention impact the Glasgow Bajuni campaigners’ asylum cases?  Is 
the denial of both their asylum applications and their ICH because ICH does not have the 
protection of the 2003 Convention?  Or, is the reverse in fact the case: does the UK’s status 
outside the Convention not have an impact upon matters of ICH?  These questions are evidently 
of relevance in the specifics of the UK context; however, because they interrogate the 
effectiveness of the Convention, they also have a wider scope.  There are also questions raised 
by the Bajuni campaigners’ cases about the extent to which migrants – and especially asylum 
                                                     
15 In the UK, the testing of language to determine a person’s country of origin is regarded as a 
controversial and flawed process (see discussion below). 
16 Nic Craith 2008.  The status of language as part of a community’s intangible cultural heritage 
remains contested and unrecognised (see discussion below). 
17 UNHCR ([1948] 2017) 
18 UNHCR 1951, Art. 1 
19 As, if their asylum claims are not accepted, they are at risk of being returned to a country in 
which they will be at risk if they practice their cultural heritage. 
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seekers, who are at the margins of the state – are given provision and protection in current 
cultural heritage instruments. 
 We address these questions throughout this paper.  To begin, we first review existing 
discussions about the relationship between cultural heritage and human rights.  In the second 
part of the paper, we discuss the details of the Bajuni campaigners’ cases; in the final section 
of the paper, we evaluate the extent to which ICH provisions are of benefit or are of detriment 
to the campaigners’ situation.  We conclude with observations about the current limitations and 
potentials of contemporary ICH instruments.   
 
Cultural Heritage and Human Rights 
Despite receiving increased attention in recent years,20 the relationship between cultural 
heritage and human rights – and more specifically, the provision made for this relationship – 
remains on rather uncertain ground.  Overt attempts to discuss cultural heritage within UN 
human rights instruments have not been forthcoming, to the extent that Lixinski has noted a 
degree of reticence on the part of to the UN to incorporate the former into the latter.21  The 
presence of heritage in human rights legislation is scant, limited to Article 15 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)22 and the Article 
27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which recognises the 
rights of minorities to ‘enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to 
use their own language’23. However, despite these initial provisions, cultural heritage rights 
have received insufficient consideration in human rights instruments.  Labadi has suggested 
                                                     
20 Logan, Langfield and Nic Craith 2010, Shaheed 2011, Silverman and Ruggles 2007. 
21 Lixinski 2013 
22 Which states that everyone should have the right to participate in cultural life, OHCHR 
1966a 
23 OHCHR 1966b, Art. 27 
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that whilst cultural heritage rights are considered problematic in a human rights context, they 
also remain under-problematised24.  Certainly, the issue is not one with an easy resolution – 
for, as Logan observes, discussions both of heritage and of human rights in a global context 
must take into account a plethora of distinct national, cultural or political approaches to the 
topics, as well as remaining aware of national and global hierarchies of power involved in any 
potential mobilisations.25  In this context, Donders observes, issues arise because ‘states do not 
always agree whether cultural rights are substantive human rights or more policy-oriented 
human rights that do not impose direct, definite obligations’26.    
In noticeable contrast to the (under)provision for heritage rights in human rights 
instruments, cultural heritage legislation has given human rights some provision.  Though older 
instruments such as the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage (1972)27 initially established a weak link with human rights28, the relationship 
has since been reconsidered and partially readdressed.  The Special Rapporteur in the field of 
cultural rights, Farida Shaheed, considers cultural heritage rights as fundamental human 
rights,29 noting that, ‘considering access to and enjoyment of cultural heritage as a human right 
is a necessary and complementary approach to the preservation/safeguard of cultural 
heritage’30. The 2005 Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society 
(also known as Faro Convention) echoes Shaheed's comments: 
 
                                                     
24 Labadi 2010 
25 Logan 2009 
26 Donders 2010, 32 
27 UNESCO 1972 
28 Logan 2008 
29 Shaheed 2011 
30 Donders 2010, 32 
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every person has a right to engage with the cultural heritage of their choice, while 
respecting the rights and freedoms of others, as an aspect of the right freely to 
participate in cultural life enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) and guaranteed by the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (1966) 31 
 
The Convention makes explicit reference to its commitment to human rights, stating:32 
 
No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted so as to: 
a. limit or undermine the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be 
safeguarded by international instruments, in particular, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms; 
 
However, though the Convention’s explicit link between cultural heritage provision and human 
rights is to be welcomed, it must also be questioned whether the provision goes far enough.  
Further additions to Article 6 clarify the Convention’s position and note that implementations 
of its provisions should not: 
 
b. affect more favourable provisions concerning cultural heritage and environment 
contained in other national or international legal instruments; 
c. create enforceable rights.33 
 
                                                     
31 Council of Europe 2005, preamble 
32 Council of Europe 2005, Article 6 
33 Ibid. 
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Though the Faro Convention’s stated commitment to the relationship between human and 
heritage rights is a step in the right direction on paper, in practice, its ambitions remain rather 
hollow, not only unenforceable, but also subordinated to pre-existing treaties and instruments 
that have lesser human rights provisions.  While within this framework there is more leeway 
for unofficial expressions of heritage such as those of minorities, its remit is curtailed by its 
regional emphasis, and to advance rights, further development of international standards is 
needed.   
 Whilst the Faro Convention leaves considerable work to be done of cementing the 
relationship between cultural heritage and human rights, it is nonetheless of note for its 
innovative and expansive use of the concept of heritage,34 which places emphases on cultural 
heritage as defined by ‘no inherent time limits, nor limits of form and manifestation.’35  In this 
context, it has had some success in making provision for forms of cultural heritage outwith 
established definitions, which in the past have focussed on an understanding of heritage as 
embodied in items, identified by experts rather than people of the community, arranged in a 
global hierarchy of value based on assigned ‘outstanding universal value’.36  The Convention 
follows moves by UNESCO to open its definition of heritage, moving from materiality to a 
processual understanding that incorporates intangibility as well37. UNESCO’s work has been 
embodied in instruments such as the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005),38 and the Convention for the Safeguarding of the 
Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH Convention)39.  The ICH Convention espouses a definition 
of cultural heritage that emphasises practiced, lived and living understandings, that include: 
                                                     
34 Jokilehto 2012, 227 
35 Fairclough 2009, 37 
36 See, for instance, the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage, 1972 
37 Bortolotto 2006, 2007 
38 UNESCO 2005 
39 UNESCO 2003a 
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intangible cultural heritage, [which is] transmitted from generation to generation, 
[and] is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their 
environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with 
a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and 
human creativity.40  
 
The Convention also takes care to note the relationship between ICH and human rights: 
 
For the purposes of this Convention, consideration will be given solely to such 
intangible cultural heritage as is compatible with existing international human 
rights instruments, as well as with the requirements of mutual respect among 
communities, groups and individuals, and of sustainable development.41 
 
The ICH Convention’s dual emphasis upon international human rights legislation and 
the requirements of communities and groups recognises the relationship between ICH and 
human rights as an issue that is both locally and (inter)nationally constituted, and requires 
human rights legislators to work with specific cultural, social and political approaches to rights 
espoused by communities and groups.  The emphasis on the perspectives of communities and 
groups is important because it challenges normative approaches (such as those noted in the 
Faro Convention above) which placed the requirements of international legislation above the 
local practices of communities and groups.  The increased focus on the requirements of 
communities and groups might be read alongside later provisions made for minority and 
                                                     
40 UNESCO 2003a, Article 2 
41 Ibid. 
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indigenous peoples, such as the 61/295 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, which notes that, ‘indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and 
develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions’42, or 
the recent OAS Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples43 that in many ways pushes 
the UNDRIP provisions on heritage to a whole new level.  These approaches begin to embed 
indigenous and minority forms of knowledge and heritage into rights-based frameworks.  
Former Special Rapporteur of the Economic and Social Council, Protection of the Heritage of 
Indigenous Peoples, Erica Daes, comments, ‘such legal reforms are vital to a fair and legal 
order because indigenous peoples cannot survive or exercise their fundamental human rights 
as distinct nations, societies and peoples without the ability to conserve, revive, develop and 
teach the wisdom they have inherited from their ancestors’.44   
It is important to note that though the 2003 ICH Convention precludes a move towards 
these more recent attempts to connect on minority and indigenous heritages with a rights-based 
context, it does not pursue the matter to the same extent as the OAS Declaration.  Perhaps as a 
result, the ICH Convention continued to omit elements of ICH that were of key importance to 
local groups and communities from its provisions.   Language is an example of one such 
exclusion.  Although language is included within the ICH Convention, Article 2a refers to 
language simply as ‘a vehicle of the intangible cultural heritage’45. The neglect of language as 
an explicit dimension of heritage has been raised as problematic by some absentees from the 
Convention46.  We argue that this demotes the status of language to ‘a vehicle of transmission 
                                                     
42 UNHR 2007, Art. 31 
43 OAS 2016 
44 Daes 1993, 13 
45 UNESCO 2003a, Art. 2a 
46 see Nic Craith, Kockel and Lloyd forthcoming, Sullivan 2012, African Union 2006, 
Preamble 
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rather than a dimension of heritage to be valued in and of itself’47.   As we note elsewhere,48 
and is apparent in the Bajuni campaigners' cases below, if robust enforcement of human rights 
provisions is lacking for matters of both tangible and intangible cultural heritage, this is 
especially the case for cultural practices, such as language, which are so far unrecognised as 
ICH.  This ‘backdooring’49 of language in such important instruments has significant 
consequences for minorities.  
 
The UK and the Convention for the Safeguarding of ICH 
The UK context in which the case study of this article is set provides additional complications 
to an already complex dynamic between human and cultural heritage rights.  The UK has signed 
and ratified both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  These documents include provisions 
related to participation in cultural life, broadly discussed, that include the right of minorities to 
‘enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own 
language’.50  However, despite its close involvement in the development of other UNESCO 
instruments, the UK has not ratified the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of ICH.  
Ostensibly, the UK government has argued against ratifying the ICH Convention on the basis 
that it considers that provisions for intangible cultural heritage are covered by the broad 
references to cultural heritage in earlier instruments.  Smith and Waterton suggest otherwise.51  
They argue that the UK refuses to ratify the ICH Convention because it presents a view of 
heritage that is in conflict with normative UK heritage precedents, that sees heritage as ‘in the 
                                                     
47 Nic Craith 2008, page 57. 
48 Nic Craith and Hill 2015 
49 Lixinski 2013, 162 
50 OHCHR. 1966b, Art. 27. 
51 Smith and Waterton 2009 
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past and an end product in itself’.52  As a result, they suggest approaches to heritage in the UK 
have ‘started to stagnate around a view of identifying national importance, establishing 
objective and immutable value of aesthetics and authenticity’.53  The UK is not the only nation-
state not to have ratified the treaty: Kurin notes that ‘several nations with a history tied to the 
UK – the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – have not signed on’, because of ‘how the 
Convention might affected historic and legally complex relationships with their native 
populations’.54  To what extent might the UK’s approach to minority groups also factor into 
the decision not to ratify the 2003 ICH Convention?  To what extent does it find the 
Convention’s emphasis on the requirements of minority groups and communities problematic? 
 In the more general context of the relationship between human and heritage rights, and 
in the specific immigration context of this paper, the UK’s failure to ratify the 2003 ICH 
Convention raises a number of questions.  The first concerns impact, and asks: what are the 
immediate consequences of the lack of recognition of the 2003 ICH Convention by the UK 
upon based cases that rely upon iterations of intangible cultural heritage?  What about iterations 
of cultural heritage (such as language) that remain unrecognised even by the ICH Convention?  
How are the human rights of the individuals involved in these cases impacted?  The second 
raises points about framing and precedent, and asks: to what extent does the UK’s rejection of 
the ICH Convention normalise particular definitions of and approaches to cultural heritage?  
How does this precedent influence other state actors involved in the evaluation of cultural 
heritage?  The third considers this question of impact outwith this specific case, and casts a 
critical eye over the potential of the ICH Convention to impact human rights.  It asks, to what 
extent do such cases suffer from the UK having not ratified the Convention?  Or, following 
                                                     
52 Orr 2011, 50  
53 Orr 2011, page 50 comments on Smith and Waterton 2009 
54 Stefano 2016, page 41, interviews Kurin. 
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Logan’s point that state ratification of the ICH Convention can impede rather than increase 
minority groups’ access to human rights,55 to what extent might they benefit from it?  To 
answer these broader questions, we first turn to the specifics of our case study. 
 
Case-Study:  the Glasgow Bajuni Campaign  
The Glasgow Bajuni Campaign began in the autumn of 2013. Formed as a last resort for its 
near-destitute members, it sought to raise awareness of the significant difficulties a small group 
of campaigners were encountering with their asylum applications to the UK.  The campaigners 
were all members of the Bajuni clan, a minority clan from the southern regions of Somalia, 
who have encountered considerable persecution due to their minority status.  On account of 
this persecution, many from the clan have fled Somalia and sought refuge in countries around 
the world.  On claiming asylum in the UK throughout the mid 2000s and early 2010s, and on 
account also of their minority status, they faced particular forms of linguistic and cultural 
'testing' to determine their nationality, a form of testing that had been approved by the UK 
Home Office since 2004.56  The following section gives some cultural and historical context to 
the Bajuni's situation, before tracing the ways in which their cultural and linguistic heritage is 
problematised in a rights-based context. 
 
Who are the Bajuni people? 
Following unrest in Somalia from 1969, the outbreak of civil war in 1991, and after decades of 
continuing conflict, Bajuni people have been displaced all over the world.57 However, those 
remaining in Somalia live on the coast of the Jubba Hoose region, in the Bajuni-founded port 
                                                     
55 Logan 2009 
56 Patrick 2014 
57 Besteman 2012 
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city of Kismayo and on the Bajuni Islands archipelago. Due to the geography of the islands 
across the Somali/Kenyan border, a subclan of the Bajuni people also live in Kenya. The term 
‘Bajuni’ is used to describe a person's overall membership in the Bajuni 'tribe', which itself is 
broken into eighteen smaller 'clans'58. Bajuni people have traditionally made their living by 
way of the sea –through fishing, trade or seamanship ---- or by cultivating land on the coast of 
mainland.59 Traditionally, the Bajuni people have spoken Kibajuni, a language related to but 
distinct from Swahili.  In more recent years, due to trade, travel and displacement, Swahili and 
some Somali has also become more common.60 
 In Somalia, the Bajuni have encountered persecution on multiple counts.61  In addition, 
though it is not the only factor in their ongoing oppression, and should not be viewed in 
isolation62, the Bajuni's clan identity and relationship to the wider Somali clan system has been 
influential in their persecution. In the wider Somali context, clan provides a structure of social 
stratification. Based on long paternal lineages, the clan system stratifies Somali people into 
majority and minority clans and subclans. The social status of a clan is informed by a number 
of elements. Somali origin narratives confer clan status and social belonging based on their 
perceived proximity to Arab ethnicity and Islam.63 Territorial and lifestyle associations further 
determine status, with the (northern) territories and (nomadic) lifestyles of those with most 
status given precedence.64 Based on these categories, clans are organised into an (ever-
evolving) hierarchy, which is bound by a common ancestry. The Bajuni people are not located 
in this clan hierarchy. Descended from a mix of African, Arab and Portuguese origins, their 
                                                     
58 Nurse 2013, 15 
59 Nurse, 2013, 2-3 
60 Ibid. 
61 Kusow 2004, Eno 2008, Abby 2005 
62 Kapteijns 2004 
63 Kusow 2004, Ahmed 1995, Mire 2016 
64 Kusow 2004, 3 
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ancestry is associated not with the Somali lineage system65, but with the peoples that 
historically occupied ancient African kingdoms in Central East Africa.66 Today, on the basis 
of their language67, they can be associated with Bantu ethnicity.68 
 As a result of their differing lineage and culture, the Bajuni people are widely 
considered to be outside the dominant Somali clan system, and are often defined as a non-
lineal, non-ethnic Somali minority clan. Their non-lineal status can be connected to a long 
history of enslavement and exploitation by both majority clans and colonial settlers.69 Today, 
they are referred to derogatively as adoon (Somali for 'slave') or tiku (Swahili for 'slave')70, and 
their non-ethnically 'Somali' origins are racially denigrated.71  In the onset of the civil war, 
majority clans sought to recruit Bajuni people to their cause, whilst violently 'clearing' the 
Bajuni people from their traditional lands.72  In the 2000s, as the Somali state collapsed, the 
extremist group al-Shabaab took over southern Somalia, including the Bajuni territories, and 
continued the persecution of minority groups. Following decades of violence, ethnic cleansing 
and enslavement, Nurse comments, ‘no one can be sure how many Bajuni remain in Somalia 
but an informed guesstimate would be at most a few hundred’.73  
 
The Bajuni campaign in Glasgow, UK 
                                                     
65 Nurse 2013, 23 
66 Eno 2008, 138 
67 Nurse 2013, 37 
68 Besteman 2012 
69 Besteman 1999, Kusow 2004, 3, Eno 2008, 140, Nurse 2013, 24 
70 Bajuni Campaign 2014 
71 Bajuni are referred to as jareer - a term which means 'hard textured hair' of people with 
'African' features, and is contrasted with jilec - the traditional 'soft-textured hair' - of lineal 
Somalis (Kusow 2004, 4) 
72 Abby 2005, 14; 40 
73 Nurse 2013,  2 
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The Bajuni Campaigners arrived in the UK in the mid 2000s, and were moved to Glasgow 
under the government Dispersal Scheme.74 UK country guidance recommends that the Somali 
Bajuni be considered for asylum because they are a persecuted minority people75 (discussed 
further below).  The Bajuni people’s lifestyle on the Bajuni Islands and their often sudden 
means of departure has meant that many of those seeking asylum in the UK arrive without 
documentation, which is required by the Home Office to provide evidence of their asylum 
claim.76  As a result, the Home Office often requires them to submit alternative forms of 
evidence of their place of origin, including undergoing Language Analysis for Determination 
of Origin (LADO) testing.  In the absence of documentation as proof of nationality, LADO is 
used by a number of countries, including the UK, as one of a number of elements that can 
determine an asylum seeker’s nationality.77  Based on guidance from linguistics experts in 
2004, LADO works from the premise that through an analysis of a combination of a person’s 
mother tongue, accent and cultural knowledge of language-use, a person’s place of origin can 
be indicated.78  For some Bajuni people, LADO testing has led to successful asylum 
applications in the UK.  However (as we discuss further below), the implementation of LADO 
testing has been found to be inconsistent, and it has also been implicated in cases in which 
applications are considered to have been wrongly refused.79  In all the cases of the Glasgow 
Bajuni campaigners, it led to their cases being refused on the grounds of ‘disputed nationality’. 
The Glasgow Bajuni campaign began in the autumn of 2013, in reaction to this outcome, the 
seven members of the campaign (six men and one woman, plus additional supporters) brought 
                                                     
74 Schuster 2004, Hynes 2011, Zetter et al. 2005 
75 Home Office 2015, 4 
76 Griffiths 2012; see Amnesty International 2012 
77 Craig 2012 
78 Patrick 2014 
79 Craig 2012, Amnesty International 2012, Allen 2008 
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together by a local activist who noticed the similarities in their cases. On their blog, the 
campaigners state their case: 
 
Just because they know that Somalis from mainland do not accept us as people from 
Somali that’s why Home Office doing this to us, treating us like animals in the streets 
without their owners. You know what… I’m so tired with this kind of life… We are 
human too just like them, so why they doing this to us? We didn’t ask God to make 
us Bajunis, but we are happy that we are Bajunis, even if we’re from minority tribe 
and small in number but all we ask is to be recognised the way we are and where we 
are from.80 
 
At the time of the campaign’s formation, all the campaign members had reached a point in their 
applications in which they were considered ‘appeal rights exhausted’.  This meant that they 
were no longer able to access the basic support systems usually available to people seeking 
asylum in the UK.  As a result, life in Glasgow for the campaigners was increasingly tough.  
Mohamed wrote a letter to the Home Office to describe the impact of its decision on his 
everyday life:  
 
It’s been 5 months now since Home Office stop supporting me. Since then, I end up 
being a beggar to the people and different Churches but now I am fed up with this 
situation. I think it is better for me to be killed by Al-Shabab and those who used to 
torturing us before, back home there than just staying here and killed softly by hunger 
in the country which believe itself that have and support Human Rights.81 
                                                     
80 Bajuni Campaign 2014; November 17th 2013 
81 Correspondence to Home Office 
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Once the Bajuni campaigners had exhausted their appeal rights, they entered an ill-defined area 
of the UK immigration system.  Though they had been refused asylum, the Home Office 
seemed to acknowledge that it was unable to ‘return’ them; however it refused to give further 
consideration to their cases.  After the refusals, the campaigners themselves could not return to 
Somalia as it remained an unsafe environment and were instead caught in a constant 
administrative process of applying for sufficient support to avoid becoming destitute.   
For Mohamed, the Home Office decision against his asylum application impacts every 
area of his life in the most challenging of ways.  From his perspective, he can see the clear links 
between (the denial of his) Bajuni heritage and the broader spectrum of Human Rights, but he 
is powerless to make the same links clear to those who have power over his case. 
 
Linguistic and cultural heritage 
For the Glasgow Bajuni campaigners, the successes of the asylum cases were closely related 
to the testing of their linguistic and cultural heritage.  The success of their cases rested on their 
ability to prove their place of origin (the Bajuni territories), their nationality (Somali) and their 
ethnicity (Bajuni).  In the absence of documentation, the UK Home Office instead required that 
they fulfil the requirements set out in CG [2004] UKIAT 0027182, an immigration test-case for 
establishing Bajuni identity. The requirements explicitly target aspects of the Bajuni peoples' 
linguistic and cultural heritage. It states: 
 
What is needed therefore in cases in which claims to be Somali nationals and Bajuni 
clan identity are made is first of all: [...] 
(a) knowledge of Kibajuni; 
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(b) knowledge of Somali depending on the person’s personal history; 
(c) knowledge of matters to do with life in Somali for Bajuni (geography, customs, 
occupations etc.).83 
 
Based on these requirements, the campaigners initially completed a series of language tests, 
both through professional language-testing companies, and in immigration court.  However, 
both the testing procedures themselves and the interpretation of their results by UK 
immigration authorities soon proved problematic. 
For instance, Nafiz was required to undergo formal LADO testing with a (then) 
government-approved testing company, Sprakab.  Until 2014, Sprakab was a UK-government 
approved LADO-testing company that employed language ‘experts’ to evaluate through 
linguistic means the nationality of asylum seekers who had arrived in the UK without 
documentation.84  The tests involved several components that evaluated the ‘level’ of their 
language (between ‘native level’ to ‘elementary level’), alongside their use of phonology and 
prosody, and their morphology and syntax for traces of linguistic habits specific to the area 
from which an asylum seeker said they came.  The tests were meant to be conducted by a native 
speaker of the language in question, with ‘expert’ knowledge of the context from which the 
applicant came.85  However, as the campaigners’ cases demonstrate, these standards were often 
not met, whilst the rigours of the linguistic testing rarely allowed for the ways in which the 
cultural and social upheaval in Somalia affected language habits. 
                                                     
83 IAT 2004 
84 Following a Supreme Court ruling in 2014 that cast doubt on its practices, Sprakab is no 
longer used by the UK government for LADO testing (Weldon 2014).  The UK Government 
now conducts LADO testing through its own representatives. 
85 See Patrick (2014) for an in-depth explanation of Sprakab methods and their underpinning 
philosophy. 
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Although Nafiz spoke Kibajuni in his interview, Sprakab concluded it was an 
insufficient percentage of Kibajuni to Swahili to 'prove' that Nafiz was Somali Bajuni.  Allen 
notes that information about the linguistic practices of Somali Bajuni people has been found to 
be out of date, based on evidence given by elders who left the islands in the 1980s.86 In the 
meantime, life on the Bajuni islands has changed. Bajuni people have travelled further afield 
for trade and shelter, and their linguistic practices have broadened to include a greater portion 
of Swahili.87 The changing linguistic practices of the Bajuni people are informed by adaptations 
to the Bajuni lifestyle and experiences over the last 30 years. The testing to which the Nafiz 
was subject relies on an idea of language as a fixed and predetermined category. As we argue 
in the literature review above, language, as other elements of intangible heritage, is subject to 
change - a characteristic enshrined in the provisions of the 2003 ICH convention.88 Moreover, 
international documents such as the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’s 
(CESCR) General comment no. 21 recommends treating ‘culture as a living process, historical, 
dynamic and evolving, with a past, a present and a future’89. The elasticity of heritage, 
including linguistic heritage, thus has change at its core. By failing to take into account how 
Nafiz's language practice evolves, the language tests disregard the processual nature of Bajuni 
linguistic practice as intangible heritage but also its legitimacy, applying the framework that 
led to the earlier definitions of heritage as static and unchanged90.  
Since the beginning of its use by the UK Government in the early 2000s, LADO testing 
has attracted significant criticism.  The case for LADO testing was initially made by a number 
of academic linguists and linguist specialists, which accepted that through an analysis of a 
                                                     
86 Allen 2008, 2 
87 Nurse 2013, 9 
88 UNESCO 2003a, art. 2.1 
89 CESCR 2009, Art. 11 
90 Bortolloto 2007, Waterton 2010 
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combination of their mother tongue, accent and cultural knowledge of language-use, it is 
possible to gain an indication of a person’s place of origin.91  However, whilst this scholarship 
suggests that LADO might be useful in providing an indication of a person’s national/ethnic 
identity, it also stresses that results should not be treated as definitive.  In addition, it 
recommends specific conditions in which the testing should be conducted, emphasising that 
testing should be led by a linguistic expert with both language and cultural knowledge-basis, 
and its conclusions should only be taken as guidance, not as fact.92  Unfortunately, as Nafiz’s 
case above indicates, these caveats have been disregarded in practice.93  In place of a nuanced 
approach to language-practice that treats linguistic ability as elastic and only a partial indicator 
of a person’s place of origin, LADO testing has instead fallen foul both of bad testing practice,94 
and been (mis)shaped into a tool through which UK immigration authorities can make zero-
sum decisions about the test results, their related asylum cases and the applicants themselves.  
Rather than taking an approach that sought to unravel the complexities of Nafiz’s and the other 
Bajuni campaigners’ backgrounds, UK immigration authorities instead began to use the tests 
to move towards a ‘blood and soil’95 logic that concluded that a person should speak in a 
particular way on account of their ethnicity.  This essentialised notion of the relationship 
between ethnicity, linguistic practice and identity goes against the recommendations of the 
progenitors of LADO testing,96  In Nafiz’s case, this approach means that in court he is judged 
on the logic of how one speaks is who one is, which, due to the circumspect results of his 
LADO tests, indicates to the immigration judge that he is not Bajuni and therefore not eligible 
for asylum.   
                                                     
91 Patrick 2014 
92 Patrick 2014 
93 Amnesty International 2012 
94 Allen 2008, Allen 2013 
95 Stevens 1999 
96 Patrick 2014 
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The approach the judge takes towards language also notably is contrary to the emphases 
of the 2003 ICH Convention, which argues for an understanding of (intangible) cultural 
heritage as practiced, elastic and changeable.  Building on Nafiz’s experiences, one might 
therefore consider the relationship between the denial of his language, the denial of his asylum 
application and the UK’s absence from the 2003 ICH Convention.  Does the UK’s absence 
from the Convention mean that Nafiz’s flexible, elastic cultural heritage is unprotected?  Does 
the UK’s absence from the Convention therefore directly have an adverse effect on Nafiz’s 
asylum application?  And what of the status of language in this scenario?  Given the current 
lack of provision for language in ICH instruments, to what extent would the UK’s ratification 
of the 2003 Convention be of benefit to Nafiz’s case?  Taking the complexity of the Bajuni’s 
situation into account, it is difficult to answer these questions with any certainty.  However, 
they remain with us as we continue our discussion. 
 
A question of ‘evidence’? 
In Nafiz’s case, the judge’s approach to the relationship between ICH and identity is damaging 
enough to result in a final judgement against his asylum claim; however, the consequences of 
this approach feature throughout his case rather than solely in the final ruling.  It can also be 
found in the ways in which immigration authorities privilege certain types of ‘evidence’.  For 
instance, in Nafiz’s case above, the judge relies upon ‘country guidance’ – a report containing 
information about Somalia, compiled from research conducted by academics and NGOs – to 
make judgements about the veracity of Nafiz’s claims.  However, despite the weight given by 
the immigration judge to the report, it is not without issue.  In the context of Bajuni asylum 
cases, a number of scholars and NGOs have raised concerns about the information contained 
   
 
 24  
 
in ‘country guidance’ documents.97  Despite these inadequacies, in Nafiz’s case, the judge 
continues to use the report to draw conclusions about Nafiz’s language-practices and ethnicity.  
Similarly, despite well-versed complaints against language-testing practices, the judge also 
treats the test results as authoritative. 
 In the context of an asylum claim, it is not unreasonable for the judge to require 
evidence of a person’s place of origin.  However, in Nafiz’s case above, the judge appears to 
give weight to the evidence and expertise to those with institutional – and specifically, state – 
connections (LADO testing is a government initiative; country guidance is complied by the 
Home Office).  In part, this may be because they appeal to a similar kind of logic that sees a 
person’s ethnicity as fixed: LADO tests, for instance, might appear to offer an almost 
‘scientific’ measure of a person’s ethnicity and place of origin, whilst country guidance offers 
a closed and confident narrative of country-specific events that might be pertinent to a person’s 
asylum application.  In contrast, alternative forms of ‘evidence’ fair badly.  For instance, 
campaigner Faraaq’s case relied upon detailed testimony formed from memories of his life on 
the island.  However, because his testimony was emotive and based on individual experiences, 
it was considered unreliable.  In similar circumstances, campaigner Mohamed, had his 
linguistic testimony dismissed by an immigration judge on the basis of a LADO test.  In 
reaction, and out of desperation, he decided to give his evidence to the judge in Kibajuni.  With 
no other option open to him, he hoped that the living, speaking example of his linguistic ability 
will present sufficient 'evidence' to the judge of his Somali Bajuni ethnicity.  However, in a 
somewhat risible display of ethnic and linguistic inhospitality,98 the Judge responded: 
 
                                                     
97 Nurse 2003, Allen 2008, Allen 2013, Amnesty International 2012 have questioned the 
reports’ information sources, the extent to which their information remains in date, and their 
treatment of language as a fixed category. 
98 Hill 2015 
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The appellant said that he was speaking in Kibajuni when he gave evidence before 
me.  I found that to be an unsatisfactory way to proceed. As a Scotsman I can hardly 
know what language was being spoken. The appellant did not provide any expert 
report which could have assisted me.99 
 
In a court setting, a lack of supporting, corroborating evidence to Faaruq’s or Mohamed’s 
claims will of course be considered problematic.  But here, it is not only that they fail to satisfy 
a burden of proof but that they try to do so with evidence that the judge – and the immigration 
system – does not consider to be evidence.  For instance, in Mohamed's attempt to give 
evidence of his linguistic and cultural heritage, the judge dismisses his submission because the 
type of evidence - a performance of living, linguistic heritage - does not correspond with the 
terms of evidence to which the immigration system is calibrated.  In Faaruq's case, his 
experience of Bajuni cultural heritage is doubted because it relies upon memory, local 
knowledge and storytelling. 
In both cases above, the type of evidence that the Bajuni campaigners seek to provide 
– and the way in which they attempt to provide it – is closely related to the performance of 
their intangible cultural heritages.  However, because this ‘evidence’ is informed by feature the 
type of qualities frequently associated with ICH – individual experience, embodied 
performance, changeable parameters – it does not fit within the immigration court’s definition 
of ‘evidence’ and is thus not seen as ‘evidence’ at all.  This has serious consequences for the 
Bajuni campaigners because though, drawing on their ICH practices, they are able to provide 
a wealth of information about their lives as Bajuni people, the information they give is not 
considered to be of relevance to their cases – and in some instances, is detrimental to their 
                                                     
99 Private correspondence 
   
 
 26  
 
success.  There is an issue here not only of framing – but also of episteme, of what is considered 
knowledge and what is not.   
The judge’s scepticism of the type of evidence the Bajuni campaigners provide is 
perhaps indicative of a broader scepticism in the UK towards matters of Intangible Cultural 
Heritage.  Again, here it is not possible to establish causality – that is, we cannot say that the 
judge’s scepticism is the result of the UK state’s approach to ICH – however, it is not 
improbable that attitudes institutionalised in one faction of the state have influence on other 
factions.  Consequently, we might suggest that dominant government attitudes towards ICH-
specific protections have influence on other areas of statecraft, including the administration of 
the state’s borders.  Not bound by the ICH Convention – and without alternative, robust ICH-
specific provisions – current UK ‘authorised discourses’100 encourage the judge to treat the 
Bajuni campaigners’ cases according to rather fixed and inflexible definitions of cultural 
expression – an approach that fails to respond to the nuance of the campaigners’ cases, and for 
which the campaigners suffer.  
 
A question of ‘expertise’? 
Inevitably, the way in which the UK immigration system questions the authority of the Bajuni 
campaigners’ ‘evidence’ led to a questioning of the authority of the Bajuni campaigners 
themselves.  In the examples above, as different immigration officers and judges cast doubt 
over both the Bajuni campaigners' evidence and nationality, their objections support and return 
to the question of 'expert' knowledge. Though the judge cannot be expected to have a working 
knowledge of Kibajuni, his treatment of Mohamed’s Kibajuni performance is dismissive from 
the outset.  Rather than simply reprimanding Mohamed, the judge might have instead sought 
to explore the circumstances that prompted Mohamed’s linguistic performance.  Instead, 
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startled by the absence of an ‘expert’ witness or report – and in part because of this absence – 
the judge rebukes Mohamed.  Meanwhile, despite Faaruq's wealth of experience of the Bajuni's 
cultural heritage, his knowledge is dismissed because it is not set out in the empirical terms of 
an 'expert'.  Similarly, despite Nafiz's multilingual ability in Kibajuni and Swahili, his case is 
dismissed on the account of 'expert' testers. In their blog, the campaigners write, 
 
Speaking about Bajunis and Kibajuni, [the authorities] call themselves as 
language experts but they know nothing about the language or tradition and culture of 
Bajunis. [...] I don’t think I can call myself an expert in front of someone who was born 
and grew up with the language or culture that I only learn from different books or 
through internet.101 
 
In all of the Bajuni campaigners’ asylum cases, the immigration authorities continually give 
precedence to the evidence and expertise of those with institutional weighting and those already 
sponsored by the state.  Their ICH practices are only accepted as ‘evidence’ in their cases when 
they are seen to cohere to state frameworks – i.e. only when they are defined by, tested against 
and analysed in the terms of the state-sponsored ‘experts’.  In many eventualities – and as is 
evident in the cases above – even if elements of ICH are accepted as ‘evidence’, it continues 
to be found wanting in the context of asylum law. 
For instance, Logan has noted that ratification of the ICH Convention can be 
detrimental to minority groups and communities because it means that the state can either 
prioritise one group over another, or prioritise a dominant community over a minority group.  
He writes, ‘governments are responsible for the official lists and they generally define the 
                                                     
101 Bajuni Campaign 2014; May 21st 2014 
   
 
 28  
 
official heritage to reflect what the dominant socio-political group or groups in a particular 
jurisdiction think is significant’.102  Our comments in this paper have so far suggested that the 
Bajuni campaigners’ cases have suffered from the UK’s absence in the ICH Convention.  
However, in the context of the Bajuni campaigners’ experience of narrative hierarchy, and with 
Logan’s comments in mind, might we reconsider?  Has the UK’s absence from the Convention 
meant that the campaigners’s cases have not been subject to the hierarchies of heritage that are 
endemic in the ratification of the Convention? 
Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case.  The emphasis that the UK immigration 
system places on certain types of ‘expertise’ implies a hierarchy of authority and knowledge 
which sees the Bajuni campaigners’ knowledge of their own ICH left with little purchase.  As 
we have discussed, this is not an unusual occurrence; rather, the state has a history of occupying 
a similar position of power when it comes to defining heritage.103  Indeed, the Bajuni 
campaigners’ cases appear to have been inserted into a hierarchy of heritage and expertise, 
even without framework of the 2003 ICH Convention.  We find two possible explanations for 
this situation: 1) in contradiction to Logan’s comments above, that this has occurred because 
the UK is not party to the ICH Convention, which would perhaps encourage the state to 
consider further cultural heritage provisions for minority groups and communities or 2) that 
this is indicative of broader institutional attitudes towards the expression of minority groups 
and communities and is likely to occur regardless of the UK’s positioning on the 2003 ICH 
Convention.  In this context, being in a state that has not ratified the Convention has not helped 
the Bajuni… however, taking into account the current limitations of the 2003 ICH Convention, 
this is not to say that a converse situation – in which the UK had ratified the Convention – 
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would present better circumstances for the campaigners.  This especially remains the case for 
the Bajuni whilst language remains unaccounted for in ICH provision. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The Glasgow Bajuni campaigners’ cases expose shortcomings in (1) contemporary approaches 
to ICH by the UK Immigration authorities, and in (2) the current provisions of the 2003 ICH 
Convention.  Firstly, the campaigners’ cases show that the lack of recognition given by the UK 
Government to the need for ICH-specific provision has influence and impact beyond matters 
that overtly relate to heritage.  Instead, as the campaigners’ cases show, the emphasis of the 
UK Government’s dominant and ‘authorised discourse’ on fixed and tangible heritage extends 
into other factions of statehood – including the immigration system – and allow for state 
representatives – including immigration judges – to advance state-supported scepticism over 
matters relating to ICH.  Whilst this may appear to be an indirect consequence of the UK’s 
stance on ICH, in the context of the immigration system, in which this approach has the 
potential to grant or withhold asylum, matters become intensely politicised.  In the Glasgow 
Bajuni campaigners’ cases, the ideologies involved in establishing the limits of the UK state’s 
‘authorised’ heritage discourse soon become closely related to establishing the limits of the UK 
state.  In this situation, definitions and determinations of heritage must be seen in the state’s 
vested interest in border maintenance and control. 
 Secondly, that in its current form the 2003 ICH Convention at best offers uncertain 
protection for groups such as the Glasgow Bajuni.  There is certainly a case to be made that 
argues that if the UK were party to the ICH Convention, the cultural heritage rights of the 
Glasgow Bajuni might enjoy more robust protection.  Ratification of the Convention might 
oblige other state actors (such as the Immigration authorities) to consider the links between 
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cultural heritage and human rights in ways they currently do not.  It also might set a more 
general tone that might encourage state actors to consider matters of ICH without state-
supported scepticism.  However, there is also a case to be made that the 2003 ICH Convention 
offers the Glasgow Bajuni campaigners little additional protection.  The issue here is in the 
emphasis the Convention places upon the role of the state to identify and nominate instances 
of ICH on behalf of communities and groups.104  This means, as Harrison observes, that 
communities and groups continue to be subordinated to the priorities of the state: ‘groups are 
subsumed within nation-states and representations of their culture employed within broader 
nationalist discourses’105.  If the state continues to dominate representations of ICH, the 
experiences, concerns and rights of minority groups and communities are likely to at best 
become occluded by state concerns.  This especially applies to migrant and asylum-seeking 
groups, which are regularly the subjects of discourses about the limits of the nation.106  
Moreover, at the margins of the state, and marginalised in state interests, asylum seeking groups 
have minimal access to rights and state provision.107  We would suggest that the 2003 ICH 
Convention makes little provision for this type of dynamic.  
These observations leave us with something of a conundrum.  Whilst the Glasgow 
Bajuni campaigner’s cases have certainly not been helped by the UK’s absence from the 2003 
ICH Convention, we would also question the extent to which they would benefit if the UK 
ratified the provision in its current form.  For the Bajuni campaigners, this offers little relief 
from an already grim situation.  At the time of writing, though the Bajuni campaigners continue 
to dispute both the refusal of their asylum cases and the grounds on which they were refused, 
they could not see how their cases might further be resolved.  In a broader context, their cases 
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prompts an urgent reconsideration of the provisions made by the 2003 ICH Convention, and 
asks, are there any circumstances under which it might be of future use to cases like that of the 
campaigners?  The recent success of the OAS Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples108 may provide some guidance.  Developed with the close involvement of indigenous 
peoples, it enshrines their rights to self-determination, multiculturalism, multilingualism and 
to ‘maintain, express and develop their cultural identity’.109  The declaration is a rare instance 
in cultural heritage instruments in which the autonomy and self-definition of the peoples 
involved are foregrounded above the role of the state.  Future developments of the 2003 ICH 
Convention might therefore look to the Declaration’s emphasis on self-determination, cultural 
expression and state-minimisation to address parallel gaps and limitations.  We would also seek 
to push the implications of the Declaration a little further.  The political and historical context 
that necessitates this Declaration is very different to that facing asylum seeking people in the 
UK.  Remaining mindful of these differences, but recognising the potential of the Declaration’s 
precedent, we would therefore ask: to what extent might it be possible to develop a similar 
instrument that makes provision for the cultural heritage rights of asylum seekers?  And how 
might we better protect and support the intangible cultural heritage for those at the margins of 
the state?  
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